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Abstract: 
 
Overriding mandatory laws present one of the most pervasive and delicate problems of 
international arbitration because these laws affect party autonomy in both its substantive and 
procedural dimension. The tension between these concepts both in theory and in practice is a 
classic emanation of the public-private divide, which is particularly problematic in 
international and transnational settings. This tension is all the stronger in the context of 
economic integration and regulation, such as in the EU Internal Market. This article revisits 
and conceptualizes the operation of overriding mandatory laws in the context of arbitration 
from the perspectives of conflict of laws, public law, and EU law. Drawing on the principles 
of effectiveness and proportionality, it proposes a practical rather than a theoretical solution 
to the dialectic relationship between private and public interests in legal certainty. 
I. Introduction 
In recent years, courts in the EU have repeatedly refused to enforce arbitration clauses when 
judges deemed that arbitrating the disputes between the parties would allow evading 
fundamental market regulations of the forum. Crucially in these cases, parties had not only 
agreed on arbitration outside the EU but also agreed on non-EU law to govern their 
transactions. Similar scenarios have arisen with choice-of-forum clauses.
1
 This court practice 
has drawn significant criticism from both practice and academia, the primary argument being 
that the lack of respect for the parties’ autonomy would undermine legal certainty. Indeed, 
the efficiency of international business transactions is considered to be fundamentally 
dependent on legal certainty; however, legal certainty is also crucial for any regulated 
markets, especially in the context of economic integration.
2 
Businesses seek legal certainty 
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for their respective private economic interests; regulators seek legal certainty to enhance 
public welfare within their respective jurisdictions. Whereas arbitration practitioners may 
worry that overriding mandatory provisions could act as an impediment to arbitration, 
regulators may wonder to what degree arbitration constitutes an impediment to the 
effectiveness of market regulation, especially in the EU Internal Market. This dialectical 
relationship between the private and the public interests in legal certainty have not yet 
sufficiently informed the debate on what is one of the most pervasive issues in the field.
3
 
 
I suggest to revisit the topic by putting these controversial court practices into the perspective 
of the public law dimension of overriding mandatory laws, which obliges the judiciary to 
uphold the public policies they enshrine (Section II). The situation becomes more 
comprehensible when considering the transnational challenge for both courts and arbitrators 
when confronting the combined effect of arbitration and choice-of-law agreements (Section 
III). The question of how to cope with the resulting potential for regulatory arbitrage is, in the 
EU, intimately linked with the principle of procedural autonomy of the Member States, which 
in turn is subject to the general requirement of effectiveness under EU law (Section IV). This 
analysis shows why courts, in principle, are right to be reluctant to enforce arbitration or 
choice-of-forum agreements where the application of EU overriding mandatory laws is at 
stake. However, it is necessary to push the public law dimension of the problem even further. 
I argue that the courts’ prima facie legitimate refusal to enforce the parties’ agreement to 
arbitrate is itself subject to the principle of proportionality, by which EU law (and 
constitutional laws in all Member States) fetters public power when it interferes with private 
rights (Section V). In particular, I argue that the courts’ central problem does not really arise 
as a consequence of the parties’ choice for arbitration. Instead, the clash with the applicability 
of overriding mandatory laws results from the parties’ choice-of-law agreement: this is what 
purportedly binds the arbitrators to the application foreign laws irrespective of the laws of the 
affected market. Accordingly, striking down arbitration clauses is unnecessary – and thus 
disproportionate – when courts could instead remedy the problematic choice-of-law 
agreement. This is possible by seeking the parties’ consent to the application of the 
overriding mandatory laws of the forum in the arbitration. If denied, the non-enforcement of 
the arbitration agreement is inevitable. If accepted, this consent would modify the choice-of-
law agreement so as to be binding on the arbitrators and would allow – and, indeed, oblige – 
the courts to refer the parties to arbitration. This pragmatic rather than theoretical solution 
finally allows to conclude with some reflections on the dialectical relationship of the private 
and the public interests in legal certainty (Section VI). 
                                                                                                                                                       
create what blood and iron could not achieve in centuries. Since only the self-determined Unity can hope to 
persist, legal equality and legal unity are insolvably linked.’ 
3
 On the subject see, e.g., P Mayer, ‘Mandatory Rules in International Arbitration’ (1986) 2(4) Arbitration 
International 274-293; LG Radicati di Brozolo, ‘Mondialisation, jurisdiction, arbitrage: vers des règles 
d’application semi-nécessaire?’ (2003) Revue critique de droit international privé 1-36; id, ‘Arbitration and 
Competition Law: The Position of the Courts and of Arbitrators’ (2011) 27(1) Arbitration International 1-25; J 
Kleinheisterkamp, ‘The Impact of Internationally Mandatory Laws on the Enforceability of Arbitration 
Agreements’ (2009) 3(2) World Arbitration & Mediation Review 91-120. 
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II. The setting of the problem 
A. Overriding mandatory laws as legal irritants 
As much as the foundations of party autonomy remain ‘elusive’ and ‘theoretically 
unresolved’,4 and public policy is perceived as ‘an unruly horse’,5 the situation is not much 
better when it comes to overriding mandatory laws. The name itself is an attempt to neutrally 
catch differing conceptualizations of a phenomenon that is the bête noire of the dominant 
bilateral conflict-of-laws doctrine. Lois d’ordre public, lois de police, lois d’applications 
immédiate ou nécessaire;
6
 Eingriffsnormen, Sonderanknüpfungsnormen, Wirtschafts-
kollisionsnormen:
7
 these French and German denominations each represent somewhat 
varying understandings as to their content, mode of operation and contextualization – and, 
most of all, efforts to contain their effect and significance. 
 
Overriding mandatory provisions are, indeed, both elusive and unruly. They are 
quintessentially non-cosmopolitan, non-libertarian, and unilateral; some would say they are 
parochial, authoritarian and exorbitant, if not chauvinist.
8
 They are the flexed muscle of the 
long-arm of interest-driven legislatures reaching beyond their jurisdictions’ domestic realm. 
They are d’application immediate in their local forum because their application is not 
mediated by neutral and gently civilizing ‘traffic rules’ and follows only from their self-
determined scope of application. Moreover, they blur the neat private-public divide by 
injecting the messy political element into the structured clean private law sphere. It thus 
comes as no surprise that conflict-of-laws scholars rarely have much sympathy for these 
unilateralist creatures and prefer to circumscribe their role to limited exceptions. The 
arbitration community is likewise irritated by this phenomenon and typically reacts rather 
allergically to the resulting interference with the parties’ contract and party autonomy.9 In 
light of conceptualizations of arbitration as part of international justice that creates its own 
                                                 
4
 J Basedow, ‘Law of Open Societies – Private Ordering and Public Regulation of International Relations’ 
(2012) 360 Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International 9, 164. 
5
 cf Burrough J in Richardson v Mellish [1824] 2 Bing 229, 252: ‘Public policy … is a very unruly horse, and 
once you get astride it, you never know where it will carry you’; contrast Lord Denning MR in Enderby Town 
Football Club Ltd v Football Assn Ltd [1971] Ch. 591, 606-607: ‘I disagree. With a good man in the saddle, the 
unruly horse can be kept in control. It can jump over obstacles. It can leap the fences put up by fictions and 
come down on the side of justice… It can hold a rule to be invalid even though it is contained in a contract.’ 
6
 See Ph Francescakis, ‘Quelques précisions sur les lois d'application immédiate et leurs rapports avec les règles 
de conflit de lois’ [1966] Revue critique de droit international privé 1; P Mayer, ‘Les lois de police étrangère’ 
[1981] Journal de Droit International (Clunet) 277. 
7
 See W Wengler, Die Anknüpfung zwingenden Schuldrechts im internationalen Privatrecht. Eine 
rechtsvergleichende Studie’ (1941) 54 Zeitschrift für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft 168; J Basedow, 
‘Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht: Theoretischer Versuch über die ordnungspolitischen Normen des Forumstaates’ 
(1988) 52 Rabels Zeitschrift 8, in English: ‘Conflicts of Economic Regulation’ (1994) American Journal of 
Comparative Law 423. 
8
 See, e.g., E Jayme, Internationales Privatrecht und Völkerrecht (Beck 2003), 28: referring to what is today Art 
9(2) of the EU Rome I Regulation as ‘a carte blanche for the caprice of national lawmakers.’ 
9
 See, e.g., M Weininger, R Byrne, ‘Mandatory Rules, Arbitrability and the English Court Gets it Wrong’ (2010) 
Cahiers de l’Arbitrage / Paris Journal of International Arbitration 201; H Dundas, ‘EU law versus New York 
Convention - who wins? Accentuate Ltd v Asigra Inc’ (2010) 76(1) Arbitration 159, 164-165: ‘The fact that EU 
law (which the judge was bound to apply) condones this [element of dishonesty of pleading on a wholly 
different basis than what was agreed] is no advertisement for the European Union's credentials as a supporter of 
a free world trade system; … this is about protectionism.’ 
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legal order,
10
 it should not be surprising to see the rise of rhetorical claims that these 
overriding mandatory laws would constitute an impediment to some ‘arbitral justice’.11 
B. Overriding mandatory rules as impediments to arbitration 
The fear that especially EU law could be an impediment to the effectiveness of arbitration 
stems in part from a series of court cases in EU Member States.
12
 In brief, German and 
Belgian courts refused to give effect to arbitration agreements out of fear over the effective 
application of their respective overriding mandatory provisions, where the parties had also 
agreed to have foreign law apply. This line of case law has now been confirmed and 
consolidated,
13
 and the situation can be summarized as follows. 
 
The analysis of Belgian courts starts with the rule that is more the product of path 
dependency than conscious conceptualization: in principle, claims involving overriding 
mandatory provisions of the forum cannot be taken out of the forum by virtue of arbitration 
or choice-of-court clauses. Belgians courts, however, exceptionally accept to enforce such 
clauses if it can be demonstrated that Belgian overriding mandatory laws will be applied 
abroad or if the laws to be applied abroad provide for equivalent protection.
14
  
 
German courts reach essentially the same result in practice, though by means of a reverse 
– and arguably conceptually sounder – rule-exception relationship. Claims involving German 
overriding mandatory rules are, in principle, capable of settlement by arbitration or in foreign 
courts; however, arbitration and other jurisdictional agreements are unenforceable if it is 
unlikely that the arbitral tribunal or court abroad will apply the overriding mandatory laws of 
the (German) forum and the applicable foreign laws provide no equivalent solution.
15
 
 
                                                 
10
 For the French case law in this direction, see below n 33 and 36. 
11
 In this sense see the panel on ‘EU Overriding Mandatory Provisions as Impediment to Access to Arbitral 
Justice?’ at the Conference of the NYU Center for Transnational Litigation, Arbitration and Commercial Law 
on ‘The Impact of EU Law on International Commercial Arbitration’ on 31 October and 1 November 2016.. 
12
 See Kleinheisterkamp, ‘Impact…’ (n 3), focusing primarily in Belgium on Cour de Cassation, 16 November 
2006, Van Hopplynus Instruments SA v Coherent Inc, [2007] Revue Belge de Droit Commercial 889, analysed 
in the context of id, 18 June 1979, Audi NSU v Adelin Petit SA, [1979] Pasicrisie I 1260, [1979] Journal des 
Tribunaux 626; id, 2 February 1979, Bibby Line v Insurance Company of North America, [1979] Pasicrisie I 
634; id, 22 December 1988, Gutbrod Werke GmbH v Usinorp de Saint-Hubert et Saint Hubert Gardening, 
[1988] Journal des Tribunaux 458; and in Germany on Oberlandesgericht München, 17 May 2006, [2006] 
Wertpapier Mitteilungen 1556, [2007] IPRax 322, analysed in the context of Bundesgerichtshof, 30 January 
1961, [1961] Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1061. 
13
 See below nn 14 and 15. 
14
 In addition to the cases discussed in Kleinheisterkamp, ‘Impact…’ (n 3) 94-99, see Cour de Cassation 
(Belgium), 14 January 2010, Sebastian International Inc v Common Market Cosmetics NV, [2010–2011] 
Rechtskundig Weekblad 2010-2011, 1087 (rejecting the argument that refusing enforcement of the arbitration 
agreement would only legitimate if there was fraude à la loi, ie, the parties’ tampering with the connecting 
factors in bad faith so as to obtaining the application of a different law), discussed by P Wautelet, ‘Arbitration of 
Distribution Disputes Revisited. A Comment on Sebastian International Inc. v Common Market Cosmetics NV’ 
in The Practice of Arbitration. Essays in Honor of Hans van Houtte (P Wautelet et al eds, Hart 2012) 217; Cour 
de Cassation (Belgium), 3 November 2011, Transat International AT Inc v Air Agencies Belgium, Pourvoi n
o
 
C.10.0613.N, available at www.juridat.be, discussed by P. Hollander, ‘Applicable Law, Jurisdiction and 
Arbitration Issues Affecting International Distribution Agreements’, in Commercial Distribution, La 
Distribution Commerciale, Commerciële Distributie (P Demolin et al eds, Larcier 2014) 335, 339. 
15
 In addition to the cases discussed in Kleinheisterkamp, ‘Impact…’ (n 3) 99-103, see Bundesgerichtshof 
(BGH) 5 September 2012, VII ZR 25/12, [2012] Betriebsberater 3103, [2012] Gesellschafts- und 
Wirtschaftsrecht 486, discussed by Basedow, ‘Exclusive…’ (n 1) 15-31. 
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Most of these cases concerned mandatory provisions in the European Commercial 
Agency Directive of 1986
16
 and are thus spin-offs from the seminal Ingmar decision of the 
EU Court of Justice (CJEU, back then still the ECJ), which was not yet concerned with 
jurisdictional issues.
17
 In the cases at hand, the parties had chosen laws and jurisdictional 
seats outside of the EU,
18
 which neither provided for any equivalent substantive protection 
nor any assurance that the arbitrators or the foreign courts would take the EU overriding 
mandatory provision into consideration, let alone apply them. In all cases, the courts 
therefore refused to give effect to the arbitration or choice of court agreements. Similar cases 
can be found in other European countries, such as Italy, England and, most recently and in 
the same vein, Austria.
19
 
C. Overriding mandatory laws as public law 
The unpopular effects of overriding mandatory laws on party autonomy, however, must be 
placed in the context of their public law nature of market regulation. As illustrated by the 
Ingmar case, they are exceptional key vehicles for implementing (only) the market’s most 
important policies, that is, those deemed so fundamental that a materially diverging outcome 
cannot be tolerated, irrespective of the international implications. If one wishes to 
conceptualize party autonomy as the outflow of fundamental or even human rights of the 
individual against the State,
20
 then it is equally necessary to recognize that overriding 
mandatory provisions are the constitutionally allowed – and, indeed, warranted – legal 
limitations to those underlying fundamental rights, enacted in the public interest. The State 
has a duty to regulate to ensure that all stakeholders in the market, and affected by it, can 
equally enjoy and develop (at least the core of) their fundamental rights. The law regulating 
private relations in particular hinges on the State ensuring a level playing field that is ‘so 
regulated that it reflects the objective order incorporated in the fundamental rights.’21 The 
arbitrages that become necessary in the policymaking process, the balancing of interests, and 
the drawing of lines between them, through the (re-)definition of rights, is primarily entrusted 
to the political legislative process.
22
 
 
In the EU, this legislative process is subject to the checks of constitutional safeguards. 
These safeguards bind the legislature to respect the judiciary and mandate it to preserve the 
                                                 
16
 Council Directive 86/653/EEC on the Coordination of the Laws of the Member States Relating to Self-
Employed Commercial Agents, [1986] OJ L382/17. 
17
 CJEU Case C-381/98, Ingmar GB Ltd v Eaton Leonard Technologies Inc [2000] ECR I-9305. 
18
 For a case regarding the contractual choice of forum in another member state, i.e., still within an area with 
harmonized law in the matter, see Corte di Cassazione 20 February 2007, case no 3841, (2008) XLIV Rivista di 
diritto internazionale privato e processuale 160; discussed by Basedow, ‘Exclusive…’ (n 1) 18. 
19
 In Italy, see Corte di Cassazione 30 June 1999, case no 369, (2000) XXXVI Rivista di diritto internazionale 
privato e processuale 741, discussed by F Ragno, ‘Inarbitrability: A Ghost Hovering over Europe?’ in Limits to 
Party Autonomy in International Commercial Arbitration (F. Ferrari ed, Juris 2016) 125-161; in England see 
Accentuate v Asigra [2009] EWHC 2655 (QB), see below text accompanying n 56; in Austria see Oberster 
Gerichtshof (OGH) 1 March 2017, case 5Ob72/16y, [2007] IHR 123 (with comments by T Eckard at 126). 
20
 Such as Basedow, ‘Law of Open Societies…’ (above n 4) 202 para 253; also M Renner, Zwingendes 
transnationales Recht - Zur Struktur der Wirtschaftsverfassung jenseits des Staates (Nomos 2011) 83. 
21
 In German constitutional law see Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG) 15 July 1998, 1 BvR 1554/89, 963, 
964/94 BVerfGE 98, 365, 395 para 90. 
22
 cf BVerfG, 27 January 2015, 1 BvR 471/10 and 1 BvR 1180/10, BVerfGE 138, 296 para 98: ‘Solving the 
normative tension between the constitutional values … is the responsibility of the democratic legislator, who in 
the [political] process of forming a public opinion has to seek a compromise acceptable for all.’ 
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essence of the individual’s rights and to optimize their effectiveness.23 This protection of the 
minority (which unsuccessfully resisted in the political process) is the legitimization of the 
majority rule that is inherent to democracy. The ultimate safeguard limiting government 
interference in individual rights is the protection against arbitrariness and excessive 
individual burdens, operationalized through the principle of proportionality, a cornerstone of 
most national constitutional laws and of EU law itself.
24
 This system of freedoms and 
limitation with checks and balances is designed to produce legality and legitimacy of the 
public interference with, and limitation of, individual rights. If the legislature had the 
competence to legislate, and if it respected the required procedures and the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality, the enacted provisions must have full effect. This is the 
implementation of the underlying policy adopted in the democratic process and cast into law. 
That is the reason, at least when the provision’s legality has been affirmed and its scope 
interpreted accordingly by the CJEU, why its internationally and overriding mandatory 
application must be the last word – at least for every judge in an EU Member State. 
III. The transnational challenge 
A. Substantive party autonomy and regulatory arbitrage 
Drilling into the public law dimension of overriding mandatory laws illustrates the dialectic 
between party autonomy and the public policies these laws seek to enforce. The issue is not 
to deny party autonomy as such; on the contrary, it is about ensuring that party autonomy can 
be exercised without infringing upon third parties’ rights and public interests and that 
contractual freedom is protected for all in the long run. This is the very old quest for balance 
between private and public interests, whose complexity increases exponentially in an 
international dimension. Cross-border transactions pose a particular challenge for the 
conceptual relationship between freedom of contract and regulatory powers. The latter find 
their limitations in the (physical) boundaries of sovereignty and territoriality, and thus 
struggle to keep control over the former when facing the discourse and the reality of party 
autonomy both in its substantive and procedural dimension.  
 
Freedom of contract, or private autonomy, allows parties to determine the content of their 
agreement: parties write down and define, and make enforceable at law and thus regulate 
among themselves, the rights and obligations they respectively wish to acquire from, and 
assume towards, each other. Party autonomy in its substantive dimension, in turn, enables 
parties to control the definition of the meaning, and thus determine the substance, of these 
rights and obligations through the choice of the applicable law. The acceptance of party 
autonomy as allowing parties to enhance legal certainty in an uncertain, because non-
uniform, transnational legal setting, also implies accepting strategic regulatory arbitrage. 
Regulatory arbitrage has been defined in the context of financial transactions as ‘those … 
                                                 
23
 See Charter of Fundamental Right of the European Union (CFR) Art 52(1), first sentence: ‘Any limitation on 
the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this Charter must be provided for by law and respect the 
essence of those rights and freedoms.’ 
24
 See Treaty on European Union (TEU) Art 5(1), first sentence, and (3), as well as CFR Art 52(1), second 
sentence. 
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transactions designed specifically to reduce costs or capture profit opportunities created by 
different regulations or laws.’25 
 
Regulatory arbitrage, such as forum shopping, is not illegal per se; arguably, it is very 
much part of party autonomy.
26
 The legitimate purpose is legal certainty: the free choice of 
the applicable law allows parties to choose the regulatory framework for their transaction. 
Indeed, the entire idea of normative competition is based on regulatory arbitrage.
27
 In the 
absence of international institutions with regulatory powers, the result is the well-known cat-
and-mouse game between regulators and international economic operators.
28
 And this is 
where overriding mandatory laws kick in. As much as the parties seek legal certainty when 
operating at the international scale,
29
 their individual needs cannot persuade regulators to let 
go of the control over the effects of such transactions on their territory. If party autonomy is 
contractual freedom with transnational ‘super powers’, then internationally or overriding 
mandatory laws are those (actually rather few) mandatory regulatory provisions that are 
equally equipped with some ‘super powers’ to reach beyond the market’s geographical 
borders. They neutralize – because they override – party autonomy (only) where the most 
important, fundamental policies are at stake. One may well have reservations and doubts 
regarding the content and scope of certain regulatory interventions, as illustrated by the 
controversial Ingmar case. However, that is, or rather should be, a very different debate about 
specific content and normative choices. In the absence of institutionalized global regulation 
of the globalized economy, which unfolds through party autonomy, the need for national 
regulation having international reach, and thus for overriding mandatory laws of the forum, 
can hardly be questioned. 
B. The tandem of substantive and procedural party autonomy 
The balance of private and public interests in terms of choice of law, however, becomes 
fragile, if not delusive, when the procedural dimension of party autonomy is added to the 
equation. As already mentioned, certain national and EU provisions are ‘overriding 
mandatory’ so long as they are part of the lex fori: they are binding for judges in the EU or in 
the Member State whose fundamental policy is at stake. That overriding mandatory effect, 
however, vanishes largely in other jurisdictions, as seen in Article 9(3) of the Rome I 
Regulation. This is arguably even more so in arbitration, which leads to the heart of the 
problem of this topic: can parties avoid l’application necessaire, and disarm the overriding 
mandatory effect of such provisions, simply by reserving the resolution of their disputes to 
courts or arbitral tribunals outside the realm of the regulator? The prima facie finding is that 
they can, at least to a rather extensive degree. 
                                                 
25
 F Partnoy, ‘Financial Derivatives and the Costs of Regulatory Arbitrage’ (1997) 2 Journal of Corporate Law 
211, 227. 
26
 See H Muir Watt, L.G. Radicati di Brozolo, ‘Party Autonomy and Mandatory Rules in a Global World’ 
(2004) 4(1) Global Jurist Advances, Art 2 para 2, although arguably confusing cause and effect. 
27
 For a critical discussion see S Francq, ‘Regulation and Party Autonomy – Public Interests in Private 
International Law’ (2016) 59 Japanese Yearbook of International Law 251, 278-283. 
28
 A Riles, ‘Managing Regulatory Arbitrage: A Conflict of Laws Approach’ (2014) Cornell International Law 
Journal 63, 65: ‘The ability of financial institutions to act beyond the reach of regulators threatens the 
sovereignty of nation-states and the well-being of national economies. Yet as regulators are well aware, the 
threat is possible only because of the differences in legal regimes. For off-shore investors, a patchy regulatory 
landscape is key to the business model; the very purpose of booking the transactions offshore, or through an 
entity that is not subject to a particular kind of regulation, is to circumvent regulatory authority.’ 
29
 As captured by the US Supreme Court in Scherk v Alberto-Culver Co, 417 U.S. 506, 516 (1974), cited above 
n 2. 
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The operation of the tandem of choice of law agreements, opting for the laws of a 
different legal order, and of jurisdictional agreements, providing for a forum or an arbitral 
seat in a foreign jurisdiction, has led Luca Radicati di Brozolo to conclude famously that 
parties can actually reduce overriding mandatory laws to mere ‘lois d’application semi-
nécessaire’, not without pointing at the potential benefits of the enhanced normative 
competition.
30
 The background against which Radicati makes his observation of the 
degradation to semi-mandatory laws is the overall pro-enforcement bias originating from the 
New York Convention, its prohibition of substantive review of arbitral awards and the 
presumption of validity of arbitral awards. Both privileges of arbitration have been developed 
further in the name of a ‘strong policy in favour of arbitration’,31 culminating in the French 
doctrines of the autonomous validity of arbitration agreements independent of any national 
contract law consideration (Uni-Kod),
32
 the immunity of arbitral awards against the effects of 
annulment in their foreign country of origin (Putrabali),
33
 and the reduction of court review 
under the public policy exception both in annulment and recognition and enforcement 
proceedings to only ‘flagrant, effective and specific’ violations of (French) international 
public policy (Thalès).
34
 Except in outrageous cases, arbitration agreements and awards can 
be expected to fly, at least in France, thus seeming to fulfil the prediction (supposedly dating 
back to Domat in 1702) that ‘l’arbitre est … le juge naturel du commerce international’.35 
C. Arbitrators as the guardians of public policies? 
Would an emerging ‘ordre arbitral international’36 and a virtually unfettered reign of party 
autonomy ruin the effectiveness of EU – or any – public policies? The most vanguard – and 
in the literal sense utopian – answer is given by Emmanuel Gaillard:37 public policies would 
not be imperilled in practical terms, because the essence of those public policies, transported 
in the vehicle of (national and thus potentially parochial) overriding mandatory laws, would 
be captured by the transnational or ‘truly international’ public policy emerging as the flip-
side of the lex mercatoria coin. This transnational public policy would be distilled through 
the comparative law method from the vast range of domestic limitations to party autonomy 
and the underlying public policies. International arbitrators could then define the boundaries 
of party autonomy and contractual freedom at the transnational level and refuse claims or 
vindications where enforcing them would violate the elaborated transnational policies. As a 
                                                 
30
 Radicati, ‘Mondialisation…’ (n 3) paras 37 and 38; see also H. Muir Watt, ‘Choice of Law in Integrated and 
Interconnected Markets: A Matter of Political Economy’ (2003) 9 Columbia Journal of European Law 383; L.G. 
Radicati di Brozolo, ‘Antitrust: A Paradigm of the Relations between Mandatory Rules and Arbitration: A Fresh 
Look at the “Second Look”’ [2004] International Arbitration Law Revue 23. 
31
 See, for example, in the US Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 
(1983); see also in England Westacre Investments Inc v Jugoimport-SPDR Ltd [1999] QB 740, 773. 
32
 Cour de Cassation (civ 1er), 30 March 2004, Uni-Kod v Ouralkali [2004] Revue de l’Arbitrage 723-24. 
33
 Cour de Cassation (civ 1er), 29 June 2007, PT Putrabali Adyamulia v Rena Holding and Mnogutia Est Epices 
[2007] Revue de l’Arbitrage 507. 
34
 Cour d’appel de Paris, 18 November 2004, Thalès v Euromissile [2004] Revue de l’Arbitrage 751, 
commented by L.G. Radicati di Brozolo, ‘L’illicéité qui ‘crève les yeux’: critère du contrôle des sentences au 
regard de l’ordre public international’ [2005] Revue de l’Arbitrage 529; confirmed by Cour de Cassation (civ 
1er), 4 June 2008, SNF v Cytec [2008] Revue de l’Arbitrage 473; but see below n 83. 
35
 See T Clay, L’arbitre (2001) 227 para 271, similarly already P Fouchard, ‘L’arbitrage international en France 
après le décret du 12 mai 1981’ [1982] Journal de Droit International (Clunet) 374 para 11; P Mayer, ‘Le contrat 
illicite’ [1984] Revue de l’arbitrage 205, 208. 
36
 For this conceptual exaltation see the French Cour de Cassation (civ 1er), 8 July 2015, Pourvoi n
o
 13-25846, 
Sté Ryanair Ltd v Syndicat mixte des aéroports de Charente (SMAC), available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr.  
37
 E Gaillard, Aspects philosophiques du droit de l’arbitrage international (2007) 176-183 paras 115-118. 
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consequence, arbitrators would no longer be required to apply national overriding mandatory 
laws. This grand construction of the transnational arbitral legal order deserves more attention 
than there is space here. Suffice it to say that this vision is simply irreconcilable with any 
notion of legitimacy, ranging from democracy to separation of powers: it can hardly be 
accepted that ‘arbitrators are becoming – if with some hand-wriggling and reluctance – 
default law makers for international traders’.38 Arbitrators cannot possibly (want or be 
wanted to) fill the void of the absence a global regulator, which states are not willing or able 
to create. Conflict of laws remains the uncomfortable and unavoidable reality. 
 
A slightly less utopian answer seems to be premised, like the previous one, on Holmes’ 
realist view that law is the nothing more pretentious than ‘the prophecies of what courts will 
do in fact do’.39 Luca Radicati, as also Pierre Mayer and Natalie Voser,40 has suggested that 
 
[t]he application of [overriding mandatory laws] by arbitrators is in a sense the 
implementation of a bargain between states, on the one hand, and the arbitral 
community, on the other hand. … [A]rbitrators may also have in mind a broader 
consideration of the ‘interests of arbitration’ which requires that they confirm the 
perception that arbitrators apply [such laws], since a generalized refusal of arbitrators 
to do so could have negative repercussions on the future amenability of courts to 
recognise arbitrability in this field.
41
 
 
As compelling as the argument may be in terms of arbitral deontology and self-
representation, it is obviously not a legal argument that could assure courts of the respect for 
their overriding mandatory provisions, as Radicati himself readily acknowledges.
42
  
 
However, more realist constructions prove equally elusive. The much-invoked obligation 
of arbitrators to render an enforceable award has traction only if the seat of arbitration is in 
the forum state whose public policies are at stake; in any other state, a request annulment of 
the arbitral award on public policy basis will usually be futile.
43
 If the seat is elsewhere, the 
award may not be enforceable in the concerned forum state owing to the public policy 
exception of Article V(2)(b) NYC. However, it is unlikely to be set aside at the (foreign) seat 
of arbitration and, as a result, enforceable in any other jurisdiction whose market is not 
affected by the transaction and which may host assets of the award debtor.  
 
Somewhat more attractive, and still unsatisfying, is the most pragmatic argument by Jan 
Paulsson,
44
 made similarly by Gary Born,
45
 that arbitrators are given (expressly or inherently) 
the mandate by the parties also to resolve their dispute over the applicable law, so long as the 
                                                 
38
 A Stone Sweet, ‘The New Lex Mercatoria and Transnational Governance’ (2006) 13 Journal of European 
Public Policy 627, 641. 
39
 O W Holmes, ‘The Path of the Law’ (1897) 10 Harvard Law Review 457, 461; invoked by Gaillard (above n 
37) 24-25. 
40
 N Voser, ‘Current Development: Mandatory Rules of Law as a Limitation on the Law Applicable in 
International Commercial Arbitration’ (1996) 7 American Review of International Arbitration 319, 337; P 
Mayer, ‘Mandatory Rules…’ (n 3) 292; id, ‘Reflections on the International Arbitrator’s Duty to Apply the 
Law’ (2001) 17(3) Arbitration International 235, 246. 
41
 Radicati, ‘Arbitration and Competition Law…’ (n 3) 18 and n 50. 
42
 Ibid. 
43
 See, e.g., J Lew, ‘Competition Law – Limits to Arbitrators’ Authority’ in Arbitrability: International and 
Comparative Perspectives (L. Mistelis, S. Brekoulakis eds, 2009) 241, 245; but see above n 34. 
44
 J Paulsson, The Idea of Arbitration (2013) 133. 
45
 G Born, International Commercial Arbitration (2nd edn, 2014) 2705. 
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arbitration agreement is coached in the usual broad terms (‘any dispute arising out of or 
relating to this contract…’). It seems difficult to conceive that the safeguard of public 
interests should depend on the exact wording of the arbitration agreement. The approach 
raises more questions in cases in which the application of an overriding mandatory provision 
is not pleaded by one of the parties.
46
 In any case, this approach advocates primarily a broad 
scope of jurisdiction, and thus maximum discretion, of the arbitrators in the matter, albeit 
without providing for any binding rules for the arbitrator to actually resolve such a true 
conflict of law.  
 
In sum, none of these constructions gives a reassuring answer to the forum’s question as 
to whether its fundamental policies underlying its overriding mandatory provisions will 
actually be given proper or at least equivalent effect in arbitration.
47
 Arbitrators themselves 
affirm ‘that international arbitrators almost invariably apply these rules, or at least consider 
the question of their applicability, and do so with considerable proficiency’.48 This is 
certainly expression of a desideratum – yet the reality looks less promising. 
 
What arguably carries more motivational weight for arbitrators are cases such as 
Hilmarton in Switzerland,
49
 the indignation over which is at the heart of the French vanguard 
doctrine to ignore the effect of the law at the seat of arbitration.
50
 Swiss courts annulled an 
arbitral award because the arbitrator had applied Algerian mandatory laws concerning 
corruption when the parties had agreed on the exclusive application of Swiss law. The same 
pattern underlies Northrop Corp v Triad Int’l Marketing, where the 9th Circuit brushed aside 
the argument that arbitrators should have applied clearly mandatory Saudi Arabian law 
prohibiting similar ‘intermediary contracts’ for the peddling of influence and insisted on the 
exclusive application of the chosen Californian law.
51
 Indeed, the arbitrators themselves had 
excluded California’s conflict-of-laws rules, and thus any renvoi to Saudi law, since this 
would ‘interject the laws of various other countries into the resolution of these disputes, 
thereby causing the uncertainty and lack of uniformity which the parties sought to avoid’.52 
The same argument has, in my own experience, much traction in arbitrations under English 
law: s. 46(1)(a) of the Arbitration Act, instructing arbitrators to apply the law chosen by the 
parties, should be read in conjunction with the no-renvoi provision of s. 46(2) to prohibit the 
arbitrators moving away from the chosen English law.
53
 Another recent example is that of an 
                                                 
46
 cf CJEU Case C-168/05 Claro v Centro Móvil Milenium [2006] ECR I-10421 para 39. 
47
 Interesting, yet unrealistic, and silent on the conflict-of-laws question, are two Law & Economics approaches 
to incentivizing arbitrators to respect mandatory laws: AT Guzman, ‘Arbitrator Liability: Reconciling 
Arbitration and Mandatory Rules’ (2000) 49(5) Duke Law Journal 1279-1334 (proposing to make arbitrators 
financially liable for failing to mandatory rules); E Posner, ‘Arbitration and the Harmonization of International 
Commercial Law: A Defense of Mitsubishi’ (1999) 39 Virginia Journal of International Law 647-669 
(suggesting random judicial review in substance of awards to as to create the fear of losing reputation by 
arbitrators if outed by courts). 
48
 See, eg, Radicati, ‘Antitrust…’ (n 30) 28, relying on H Grigera Naón, Choice of Law Problems in 
International Commercial Arbitration (2001) 13. 
49
 Cour de Justice du Canton de Geneve, 17 November 1989, Omnium de Traitement et de Valorisation (OTV) v 
Hilmarton, confirmed by the Federal Tribunal, 17 April 1990, both in (1994) XIX Yearbook of Commercial 
Arbitration 214-222, especially the former at 217-218. 
50
 See V Heuzé, ‘La morale, l’arbitre et le juge’ [1993-3] Revue de l’Arbitrage 179-198. 
51
 Northrop Corp v Triad Int’l Marketing SA, 811 F.2d 1265, 1270 (9th Cir. 1987), referring to the passage of 
Scherk v Alberto-Culver Co, 417 U.S. 506, 516 (1974) cited above n 29; Northrop pre-empts at least for 
California the application of §187(2) Restatement (Second) Conflicts. 
52
 See Northrop (n 51) 1267. 
53
 But see the argument made by Mitsubishi’s lawyer before the US Supreme Court, arguing that Swiss law 
would allow a renvoi to US law, Transcript of Oral Argument Mitsubishi v Soler at 18, 473 U.S. 614 (1985) 
(No. 83-1569). On such renvoi under Art 19 of Swiss Law of Private International Law, see H van Houtte, ‘The 
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arbitral tribunal sitting in New York and mandated to apply New York law to a maritime 
agency agreement that did not consider an Austrian agent’s counter-claim for compensation 
under EU law, despite the fact that in parallel proceedings brought by the agent in Vienna, 
the US principal acknowledged the agent’s entitlement when arguing (ultimately 
unsuccessfully) that this claim should be subject to the arbitration clause.
54
 Other similar 
cases confirm the preference for party autonomy over overriding mandatory laws.
55
 
 
A particularly telling example is the indifference of the Canadian arbitrators in 
Accentuate v Asigra, which later played out in the English High Court. They affirmed that 
‘[t]here may be interesting academic and intriguing domestic and international policy reasons 
why an arbitral tribunal should or should not apply non lex contractus mandatory rules of law 
to certain situations’ and acknowledged the Ingmar case law of the CJEU, just to conclude 
that ‘this does not justify restricting the parties’ freedom to choose a desired governing law in 
Ontario’ and to apply exclusively the latter.56 Remarkable are also the English judge’s 
comments in Accentuate. Tugendhat J first determined that the claim brought by the English 
distributor could not be obstructed by the arbitration agreement – and, indeed, the award – 
because of the need to give effect to the English provisions transposing the Commercial 
Agency Directive, which were overriding mandatory provisions according to Ingmar. He 
then observed: 
 
I wish to add that nothing in this judgment should be taken as a criticism by me of the 
conduct or reasoning of the Arbitral Tribunal. ... [I]t was the duty of the Tribunal to 
apply the law which, according to the [contract], was designated by the parties as the 
law applicable to the substance of the dispute: see UNCITRAL Art 33. The passages 
cited from the Award … above demonstrate that the Tribunal was fully conscious of 
the relevant considerations. They were clearly aware that the English court might 
approach the matter differently for reasons which do not reflect adversely upon the 
Tribunal.
57
 
 
This much solicitude for the arbitrators’ considerations is somewhat surprising in view of 
the costs that their decision not to apply the EU overriding mandatory provisions – contrary 
to the postulates of the aforementioned arbitration literature
58
 – inflicted on the Canadian 
principal.
59
 However, the point is that judges, even when enforcing overriding mandatory 
provisions against the parties’ tandem of arbitration and choice-of-law clauses, do not 
actually expect arbitrators to apply them. It is consequently not surprising that European 
judges, in case of doubt, refuse to give effect to the parties’ transactional constructions that 
appear to aim at reducing the overriding mandatory provisions of the forum to lois 
                                                                                                                                                       
Application by Arbitrators of Articles 81 & 82 and Their Relationship with the European Commission’ [2008] 
European Business Law Review 63, 67-68. 
54
 Oberster Gerichtshof 1 March 2017 (n 19) para III(4). 
55
 ICC Award no. 6379 (1990) XVII Yearbook of Commercial Arbitration 212; ICC Award no. 12193 (2004) 
(2007) 134 Journal du Droit International 1276; both cited by Wautelet (above n 14) 227 nn 65 and 67. See also 
Cour d’appel de Paris, 24 November, 2005, [2006] Revue de l’Arbitrage 717. 
56
 Excerpt of the award of 3 March 2008, paras 18-20, cited in Accentuate v Asigra [2009] EWHC 2655 (QB) 
para 73. 
57
 Ibid para 96. 
58
 Above n 48; see also LG Radicati ‘Mandatory Rules and International Arbitration’ (2012) 23 American 
Review of International Arbitration 49, 72. 
59
 Tugendhat J subsequently rejected a part of the legal costs claimed by the victorious English distributor; see 
Accentuate Ltd v Asigra Inc [2013] EWHC 889 (QB). 
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d’application semi-nécessaire. However, turning back to the original question: why do these 
provisions need to remain d’application nécessaire? 
IV. Procedural autonomy  
and the principle of effectiveness 
A. The principle of procedural autonomy of the Member States 
The fundamental question is: to what degree does EU law actually compel judges to deny the 
enforcement of arbitration agreements where they cannot expect that the overriding 
mandatory laws of the forum will be applied in the arbitration or courts abroad and that the 
then applied foreign laws provide no equivalent solution?
60
 Some argue that it does not. 
When discussing a decision of the German Bundesgerichtshof that rejected the need for 
requesting a preliminary ruling from the CJEU as to whether Ingmar could justify not 
enforcing a choice-of-forum agreement, Jürgen Basedow points at the ‘principle of 
procedural autonomy of the EU Member States’, from which he concludes: 
 
Thus, the effectiveness of enforcement mechanisms for the post-contractual 
compensation of commercial agents is not ensured by the law of the Union, instead 
being entrusted to the Member States, and the obligation of the Member States is 
expressed with some reserve: they ‘must not render practically impossible or 
excessively difficult’ the exercise of individual rights. This negative obligation is 
clearly less than a duty to ensure the greatest possible effect to exercise the rights in 
question. Thus, the effectiveness of the right to such payments is a matter for national 
law, with some broad limits drawn by the law of the Union.
61
 
 
The ‘principle of procedural autonomy’ is also the main argument when it comes to how 
much pro-arbitration bias national arbitration laws of Member States may promote despite 
the requirements of EU law. The CJEU confirmed in EcoSwiss v Benetton the prohibition of 
anti-competitive agreements in (what is now) Article 101 TFEU as constituting an overriding 
mandatory provision of EU law.
62
 Questions of EU law raised in arbitration would need to 
remain under the control of ordinary courts at the different stages of review of the award, 
‘which may be more or less extensive depending on the circumstances’.63 Moreover: 
 
[i]t follows that where its domestic rules of procedure require a national court to grant 
an application for annulment of an arbitration award where such an application is 
founded on failure to observe national rules of public policy, it must also grant such 
                                                 
60
 D Quinke, ‘Arbitration of Disputes from Commercial Representation in Germany’ in Arbitration in Germany 
(KH Böckstiegel et al eds, 2nd edn, Kluwer 2015) 817, 825 para 30, suggests ‘reasonable certainty’ as the 
threshold rather than a ‘likely danger’ of non-application of the forum’s overriding mandatory provisions as 
required by the OLG München (n 12). 
61
 Basedow, ‘Exclusive…’ (n 1) 29. 
62
 CJEU Case C-126/97 EcoSwiss China Time Ltd v Benetton International NV [1999] ECR I-3055 para 36, 
referring to what is now Art 3(1)(b) TFEU, which defines the regulation of competition in the Internal Market as 
an exclusive competence of the EU. 
63
 Ibid para 32, relying on Case 102/82 Nordsee Deutsche Hochseefischerei GmbH v Reederei Mond 
Hochseefischerei Nordstern AG & Co. KG and Reederei Friedrich Busse Hochseefischerei Nordstern AG & Co 
KG [1982] ECR 1095 para 14, which also established in paras 10-13 that an arbitral tribunal is not ‘a court or 
tribunal of a member state’ within the meaning of (now) Art 267 TFEU. 
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an application where it is founded on failure to comply with the prohibition laid down 
in [now] Article [101] of the Treaty.
64
 
 
This decision has been hailed as implicitly recognizing that competition law matters are, 
in principle, capable of settlement by arbitration in Europe.
65
 Much attention has also been 
given to the other part of EcoSwiss, in which the Court clarified: 
 
that [EU] law does not require a national court to refrain from applying domestic rules 
of procedure according to which an … award … in respect of which no application 
for annulment has been made within the prescribed time-limit acquires the force of 
res judicata and may no longer be called in question by a subsequent arbitration 
award, even if this is necessary in order to examine … whether an agreement which 
the interim award held to be valid in law is nevertheless void under Article [101] of 
the Treaty.
66
 
 
This is, indeed, an expression of the ‘principle of procedural autonomy of the Member 
States’. That has motivated some to extrapolate this principle as a carte blanche for the 
abovementioned French doctrine of minimalist court review of awards for public policy 
violation resulting from the Thalès case law in terms of compatibility with EU law.
67
 The 
same spirit is found in Basedow’s argument that procedural autonomy would grant courts of 
Member States the freedom not to refuse enforcement of jurisdictional agreements despite the 
expectation that an overriding mandatory provision of the forum will be neither applied nor 
compensated for by an equivalent foreign provision. In both instances, it is questionable that 
the CJEU would appreciate the ‘principle of procedural autonomy’ in such a manner as 
suggested by the opinion of AG Wathelet in Genentech v Hoechst and Sanofi-Aventis.
68
 
Quite to the contrary: national procedural autonomy does not, itself, limit the principle of 
effectiveness of EU law but is a subordinate principle of practical application to the latter, 
which thus deserves some more attention. 
B. The context of the principle of effectiveness 
The CJEU in Nordsee and, building thereon, in EcoSwiss insisted on the importance of 
references for preliminary rulings to the CJEU in order to ensure the uniform application of 
EU law
69
 – a path not open to arbitral tribunals as mere creatures of contract and thus not 
‘courts or tribunals of a Member State’ in the sense of [now] Article 267 TFEU. The 
orthodoxy of the European legal construction would be at stake if the implementation of EU 
                                                 
64
 Ibid para 37. 
65
 See, eg, S. Brekoulakis, ‘Arbitrability – Persisting Misconceptions and New Areas of Concern’ in 
Arbitrabiity: International and Comparative Perspectives (L. Mistelis, S. Brekoulakis eds, Kluwer 2009) 19, 
21; Lew (n 43) 255. 
66
 Case C-126/97 EcoSwiss (n 62) para 48. 
67
 See, eg, E Cheng, B Ward, ‘Application of EcoSwiss to French Annulment Proceedings’ (27 January 2005), 
http://www.internationallawoffice.com; R Nazzini, ‘International arbitration and public enforcement of 
competition law’ [2004] European Competition Law Review 153, 155. For Thalès see above n 34. 
68
 Opinion of Advocate General M. Wathelet in CJEU Case C-567/14 Genentech v Hoechst and Sanofi-Aventis 
(17 March 2016) paras 55-72, especially 58. 
69
 Case 102/82 Nordsee (n 63) para 14 (‘Community law must be observed in its entirety throughout the 
territory of all the Member States; parties to a contract are not, therefore, free to create exceptions to it’); Case 
C-126/97 EcoSwiss (n 62) para 40 (‘it is manifestly in the interest of the Community legal order that, in order to 
forestall differences of interpretation, every Community provision should be given a uniform interpretation, 
irrespective of the circumstances in which it is to be applied (Case C-88/91 Federconsorzi [1992] ECR I-4035, 
paragraph 7)’). 
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law were to diverge materially from one Member State to another.
70
 Accordingly, (now) 
Article 5(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) spells out the requirement of 
effectiveness as a benchmark for uniformity, which in the EU necessitates the principle of 
sincere cooperation and translates into a specific obligation of all Member States. 
 
This requirement of effectiveness has been elaborated by the CJEU in a long line of 
cases:  
 
In such circumstances [of lack of EU rules], it is for the domestic legal system of each 
Member State to designate the courts and tribunals having jurisdiction and to lay 
down the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding rights which 
individuals derive from [EU] law, provided, first, that such rules are not less 
favourable than those governing similar domestic actions (principle of equivalence) 
and, second, that they do not render virtually impossible or excessively difficult the 
exercise of rights conferred by [EU] law (principle of effectiveness).
71
 
 
The first part of this sentence later evolved into the CJEU affirming in 2006 the already 
mentioned ‘principle of procedural autonomy of the Member States’.72 However, as its 
genesis shows, this principle only applies for the purpose of filling a void left by EU law.
73
 In 
filling this gap by domestic procedural law, Member States are then acting as trustees of the 
interest of the EU, which necessarily requires allowing for some variance in procedural terms 
– but not in terms of substance. National procedural provisions cannot, of their own right, 
take any precedence over substantive EU law. They merely remain applicable to the degree 
that they actually accord with general principles on which EU law itself is based,
74
 such as 
the protection of legitimate expectations or, like the time-limitation issue in EcoSwiss, legal 
certainty and res iudicata.
75
 Put differently, if national procedural law circumscribes the 
application of substantive EU law, this is not because of a higher principle of ‘national 
procedural autonomy’ but because EU law relies on national procedural law for its own (EU 
law) purposes.
76
 
 
National procedural provisions, even if ‘autonomous’, must still comply with the 
requirement of effectiveness, which means that, at the very minimum, they should ‘not make 
the exercise of the rights conferred … [in practice] virtually impossible or excessively 
                                                 
70
 cf CJEU Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585 para 17: ‘The law stemming from the Treaty, an 
independent source of law, could not, because of its special and original nature, be overridden by domestic legal 
provisions, however, framed, without being deprived of its character as community law and without the legal 
basis of the Community itself being called into question.’ 
71
 CJEU Case C-231/96 Edis v Ministero della Finanze [1998] ECR I-4951 para 34, relying on Case C-261/95 
Palmisani v INPS [1997] ECR I-4025 para 27; reaffirmed in Case C-260/96 Ministero delle Finanze v SPAC 
[1998] ECR I-4997 para 18; Case C-228/96 Aprile v Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato [1998] ECR I-
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 Joined Cases C-392/04 and C-422/04 i-21 and others v Germany [2006] ECR I-8559 para 57. 
73
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 For the status of general principles of law as primary EU law see CJEU Case 29/69, Stauder [1969] ECR 419 
para 7.   
75
 See Joined Cases C-392/04 and C-422/04 i-21 and others v Germany [2006] ECR I-8559 para 57; see W 
Schroeder, in EUV / AEUV (R Streinz ed, 2nd edn, Beck 2012) AEUV Art. 288 para 43.  
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 Schroeder (n 75) para 43 and n 141; CM Kakouris, ‘Do the Member States Possess Judicial Procedural 
“Autonomy”?’ (1997) 34 Common Market Law Review 1389, 1404. 
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difficult’.77 If taken in isolation, one could conclude – as Basedow does – that ‘this negative 
obligation [would be] clearly less than a duty to ensure the greatest possible effect to exercise 
the rights in question.’78 This misses the point, however, as clarified by the current President 
of the Court, Koen Lenaerts: 
 
There is a fundamental difference between the national procedural autonomy to 
provide adequate remedies, which may indeed result in differences in enforcement of 
EU law and the prior question whether a certain EU norm can be invoked before the 
national judge. The former is as a matter of subsidiarity usually left to the Member 
States and rightly so. The latter should be a matter of EU law, applying equally across 
all the Member States, thus giving everyone as much or as little chance to rely on EU 
law using whatever procedural format the Member State provides for this.
79
 
 
Compelling a party to bring a claim on the basis of an overriding mandatory provision in a 
non-EU forum and against the odds of a choice-of-law clause mandating the application of 
non-EU law, given the predictability of failure as well as the time and costs involved, is 
making the exercise of that right ‘virtually impossible or excessively difficult’.  
 
Moreover, effectiveness is required not only in negative terms but also in positive 
terms,
80
 as clarified by the CJEU: 
 
For that purpose [of guaranteeing the application and effectiveness of EU law], whilst 
the choice of penalties remains within [the Member States’] discretion, they must 
ensure in particular that infringements of [EU] law are penalized under conditions, 
both procedural and substantive, which are analogous to those applicable to 
infringements of national law of a similar nature and importance and which, in any 
event, make the penalty effective, proportionate and dissuasive. 
81
 
 
The much-criticized refusal of courts to enforce choice-of-forum or arbitration agreements in 
tandem with choice-of-law clauses where EU public policies are at stake is precisely such a 
sanction mandated by EU law. The importance of the principle of effectiveness becomes 
even more tangible when considering the consequences of courts’ failure to ensure such 
effectiveness: under the Francovich I case law, this would arguably give rise to liability of 
the Member State to the individuals protected by the EU substantive provisions in question.
82
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C. The requirement of effectiveness and its impact on arbitration 
The limits of national procedural autonomy have been clearly captured by AG Wathelet in 
Genentech: ‘No system can accept infringement of its most fundamental rules making up its 
public policy, irrespective of whether or not those infringements are flagrant or obvious… 
Put another way, one or more parties to agreements which might be regarded as 
anticompetitive cannot put these agreements beyond the reach of review under Articles 101 
TFEU and 102 TFEU by resorting to arbitration.’83 Put yet another way, it is simply 
unacceptable, because it is unconstitutional, for judges to let deference to arbitration water 
down ‘the most fundamental rules making up [a country’s] public policy’ to merely ‘semi-
mandatory rules’.84 
 
This reasoning mutatis mutandis shows also the insufficiency of the proposals that courts 
should only refuse to enforce arbitration or choice-of-forum agreements in the case of ‘fraude 
à la loi’85 or ‘in clearly abusive circumstances’.86 Courts have rightly refused to restrain 
themselves to this very restrictive criterion.
87
 Such a minimalist approach would, in fact, be 
the equivalent to the problematic French Thalès logic at the stage of court scrutiny of the 
arbitration agreement for compatibility with the public policy of the forum. It is equally not 
compatible with the requirement of substantive effectiveness of EU law. Indeed, it would 
make little sense, also in terms of costs, to first pursue pointless arbitration or court 
proceedings, in which the EU overriding mandatory provisions are not expected to be 
applied, and then litigate anew the same dispute.  
 
The concept of lois d’application semi-nécessaire may be an accurate factual description 
of an enforcement deficit in the transnational dimension of the globalized economy, but it is 
not a legal concept that could justify accepting such a regulatory deficit. Specifically, in the 
EU, the courts’ refusal to give effect to arbitration agreements that would undermine the 
effectiveness of EU overriding mandatory provisions is nothing but an application of the 
principle of effectiveness in its negative dimension. The resulting frustration of the parties’ 
(not the Member States’) procedural autonomy is, indeed, regrettable – and yet just the kind 
of sanction that, at least as a starting point, may even be required from Member States to 
ensure the full effectiveness of EU law.
88
 Concerns that this approach would be merely 
speculative and should rather be left to the ex post control at the stages of enforcement, as 
suggested by the US Supreme Court in Mitsubishi,
89
 cannot prevail over the effectiveness of 
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core public regulation. Advocating a solution à la Mitsubishi is not only unrealistic where 
courts actually adopt the problematic minimalist ex post control of public policy.
90
 As already 
noted, sending parties first off to a pointless arbitration is incompatible with the court’s 
obligations to respect procedural efficiency as well as the EU requirement of substantive 
effectiveness. The reactions of European courts to potential circumventions of their 
overriding mandatory laws, especially those originating in EU law, can thus hardly be 
condemned as a matter of principle.
91
 What then remains as a question is whether breaking 
the arbitration agreements is actually the only and necessary consequence. 
V. Proportionality and Pragmatism 
There is, after all, a solution to the seeming antagonism between the need for effectiveness of 
EU overriding mandatory provisions and the efficiency of international arbitration. This 
solution emerges from the public law dimension of the problem. As elaborated above,
92
 
overriding mandatory provisions limit the fundamental rights of the parties upon which party 
autonomy is constructed. The refusal to enforce the parties’ choice-of-law agreement and 
their arbitration or choice-of-forum agreement is, as such, a legitimate yet harsh sanction. 
This sanction is an interference of the State (here the EU through the judges of a Member 
State) with the freedom of the parties that can be justified only to the degree that it is 
necessary. This follows directly from the principle of proportionality, which is the essential 
constitutional limitation of all exercise of sovereign power affecting the fundamental rights of 
individuals. This principle binds all public powers both at the EU level and at the level of the 
Member States,
93
 whose constitutions mostly recognize the same principle.
94
 As much as it is 
partially recognized that the legislature has a particular broad margin of appreciation in the 
field of economic ordering,
95
 freedom of contract is recognized to be covered by the 
fundamental rights of the EU – and thus subject to the principles of proportionality.96 This 
means, in the CJEU’s own words: 
 
In accordance with the principle of proportionality, which is one of the general 
principles of [EU] law, the lawfulness of the prohibition of an economic activity is 
subject to the condition that the prohibitory measures are appropriate [or suitable] and 
necessary in order to achieve the objectives legitimately pursued by the legislation in 
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question, it being understood that when there is a choice between several appropriate 
measures recourse must be had to the least onerous, and the disadvantages caused 
must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued.
97
 
 
This is the benchmark of legality that the legislator has to respect when devising overriding 
mandatory laws, as well as courts when interpreting provisions as constituting overriding 
mandatory rules. 
A.  Suitability 
Maybe proportionality is also the underlying point that Basedow has in mind when he argues 
that refusing to enforce a jurisdiction agreement and entertaining the claim by the protected 
European party is ‘far from being effective; in terms of its broader impact, it is almost 
completely ineffective by its very nature.’98 That is because an EU judgement that ignores an 
arbitration agreement for the purposes of giving effect to the overriding mandatory provisions 
is only enforceable within the EU. Anywhere else, especially in the foreign party’s home 
jurisdiction, the enforcement is likely to fail. Indeed, courts outside the EU, not bound by EU 
public policy considerations, will usually not refuse recognizing the validity of the choice-of-
forum or arbitration agreement, which is then an obstacle to recognizing a European court’s 
jurisdiction as well as its judgements. With this in mind, Basedow suggests: 
 
Well-advised principals from third states will react to this case law by cautiously 
avoiding the placement of any assets in the EU which might serve as the basis for the 
subsequent enforcement of an agent’s claims. For the everyday payment operations 
undertaken in Europe, a bank account in the Principality of Liechtenstein (or other 
similar places) will usually be sufficient; in Liechtenstein, a Contracting State of the 
European Economic Area, judgments from EU Member States will be not be enforced 
under Brussels I or the Lugano Convention. Moreover, well-informed principals, 
when negotiating an agreement with an EU agent, will use the uncertainty of a duty to 
pay post-contractual compensation as an argument to squeeze the agent’s 
remuneration that is due during the term of the contract. Thus, instead of protecting 
the agent, the courts might pave the way for the principal’s higher profits.99 
 
First, this point sits uncomfortably with Basedow’s subsequent conclusion that 
arbitration agreements should be disregarded for the purpose of protection against abusive 
circumvention in the particular circumstances of the case.
100
 If things were as related by 
Basedow,
101
 courts in the EU would have indeed an even more legitimate case to start from 
the presumption that such critical ‘off-shore’ arbitration or choice-of-forum clauses flanked 
by choice-of-law clauses should not be given any effect. Moreover, the suggestion to focus 
on abuse in the particular case is not quite in line with the nature of overriding mandatory 
laws as elaborated by Basedow himself: they are supposedly precisely not mere domestic 
statuta interventionalia that protect special group interests but statuta institutionalia that 
implement policies fundamental for the states’ economic, social and political functioning.102 
The protection they provide to individuals is secondary and just a means, not the goal. 
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Second, the deeper legal point seems to be that the principle of effectiveness is not 
served by the courts’ disregard for the parties’ procedural autonomy when the application of 
overriding mandatory laws is at stake because of the parties’ possibility of escaping 
nevertheless. Re-contextualized in light of the public law dimension of overriding mandatory 
laws, Basedow’s argument could be that the courts’ repressive approach would fail the first 
hurdle of the test of proportionality, which is that the measure needs to be suitable for 
attaining the pursued policy goal. However, this would ignore the already mentioned 
deference owed to the regulator’s margin of appreciation and prerogative of choice of means, 
especially in economic matters.
103
 More importantly, the argument relies on the same fallacy 
that animates the construct of lois d’application semi-nécessaire:104 a sanction enforcing a 
regulatory measure designed to remedy a market failure cannot possibly be unsuitable 
because the regulated actors simply recur to ever more inventive transactional engineering 
and regulatory arbitrage to undermine the regulatory effort. Otherwise, most financial 
regulations (if not all regulation in the face of globalization) would likely fail the test of 
proportionality and have to be declared illegal.  
 
The argument is more than questionable as a matter of fact. Accessing the EU market 
without having any assets whatsoever, merchandise or payments, within the reach of 
execution measures of European courts may be possible – yet at potentially significantly 
increased transaction costs. Hardly any foreign company will want to operate at a larger scale 
in such circumstances on one of the world’s largest markets. The recent standoff between the 
EU and globally operating tobacco corporations over the operation of a vast tobacco 
smuggling scheme involving tax fraud and money laundering illustrates this well: in view of 
keeping access to the EU market, all corporations seated outside the EU but one accepted the 
tough conditions imposed by the Commission as settlement for their involvement in the 
scheme.
105
 The sanction of seriously complicating, if not outright excluding, access to the EU 
market should provide enough leverage in most cases to obtain compliance with EU 
judgements giving effect to the overriding mandatory provision in question. Consequently, 
refusing to give effect to the arbitration or jurisdictional agreement is not, as such, an 
unsuitable sanction. 
B. Necessity 
If the regulatory measure pursues a legitimate policy objective and is not clearly unsuitable, it 
is still disproportionate if its impact on the individual’s rights exceeds what is necessary to 
achieve the intended objective. This is a general principle of EU law and explicitly enshrined 
in Article 5(3) TEU, as well as in the case law relating especially to fundamental rights.
106
 
The question for the present purposes is whether there is a less restrictive alternative measure 
that is equally as effective in obtaining the policy objective. 
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1. Focusing on the problem: the choice-of-law agreement 
The path to such an alternative solution can be found in Mitsubishi,
107
 the very decision that 
pioneered the departure from general exclusions of certain matters from arbitration towards 
ensuring application of mandatory laws in matters of public policy. The intriguing question 
remains: what made the US Supreme Court reverse an order by which the Court of Appeals 
for the First Circuit found that antitrust claims brought by a car dealer in the context of the 
termination of a distribution agreement would not be capable of settlement by arbitration? 
The US Sherman Act clearly intended to govern these claims, but the Supreme Court 
accepted these to be referred to an arbitral tribunal composed of three Japanese arbitrators, 
sitting in Japan, and called upon to apply Swiss law. 
 
 
Arguably, this bold step was not only motivated by the manifold policy considerations 
that the Supreme Court elaborated upon in its judgement but also by an imminently practical 
one. The Court noted in footnote 19 ‘that in the event the choice-of-forum and choice-of-law 
clauses operated in tandem as a prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory 
remedies for antitrust violations, we would have little hesitation in condemning the 
agreement as against public policy.’108 This suggests that, at the outset, the Court took more 
or less the same position as the Belgian and German courts.
109
 However, a factual detail 
given in the same footnote shows why the Supreme Court did not feel the need to condemn 
the parties’ agreement providing for arbitration in Japan according to Swiss law: ‘At oral 
argument, however, counsel for Mitsubishi conceded that American law applied to the 
antitrust claims and represented that the claims had been submitted to the arbitration panel in 
Japan on that basis.’110 
 
Irrespective of the controversy over what the US Supreme Court actually meant in 
footnote 19, the approach of seeking an undertaking that those – and only those – issues 
intended to be governed by the forum’s overriding mandatory rules shall be governed by 
them, irrespective of the lex contractus, is pragmatic and efficient.
111
 Indeed, this approach is 
the most convincing key to solving the courts’ dilemma between respecting the parties’ 
original intention to arbitrate and their legislatures’ intention to protect fundamental public 
interests. It is for the parties to give the judges the elements they need to determine the 
relevancy of their overriding mandatory provisions in the dispute. As shown above,
112
 the 
courts simply cannot tolerate their overriding mandatory provision to be de-activated by party 
autonomy since the former are necessarily, and legitimately, limits to the latter. That being 
said, before striking down the parties’ contractual construction the courts must first verify 
whether the circumstances of the case may nevertheless allow respecting the arbitration 
agreement without compromising their duty to ensure the effectiveness of the fundamental 
policies in question. It is then for the party requesting the enforcement of the arbitration 
agreement to present the necessary clarification. 
                                                 
107
 Above n 89. See already Kleinheisterkamp, ‘Impact…’ (n 3) 115-117. 
108
 Mitsubishi (n 89) 637 n 19. 
109
 See above text accompanying nn 14 and 15. 
110
 Mitsubishi (n 89) 637 n 19. 
111
 Similarly, the Australian Federal Court in Comandate Marine Corp v Pan Australia Shipping Pty Ltd [2006] 
FCAFC 192 paras 241 and 254; compare in the US Mohamed v Uber Technologies, Inc., __ F.3d __, 2016 WL 
4651409 (9th Cir., Sept. 7, 2016), with reference to American Express Co v Italian Colors Restaurants, 133 
S.Ct. 2304, 2310 (2013) (quoting footnote 19 of Mitsubishi). 
112
 See above text after nn 79 and 90. 
  21 
 
This should be rather unproblematic in the absence of a choice-of-law clause, so long as 
the applicable conflict-of-laws rules can be expected to select the law of the country whose 
fundamental policy is at stake.
113
 On the other hand, where the parties have submitted their 
contract to foreign law, the party requesting arbitration has the opportunity to show to the 
court that the protection afforded by the lex contractus is equivalent to that of the lex fori, 
thereby ensuring an outcome that will not clash with the forum’s public policy. If such 
equivalence cannot be established or remains doubtful, the requesting party’s last resort 
would be – as in Mitsubishi – to give an undertaking that it expects and accepts the 
application of the overriding mandatory laws of the forum by the arbitrators. Once recorded 
by the court, this would then constitute a variation of the original choice of law agreement by 
confirming the applicability of the forum’s overriding mandatory laws to the regulatory 
issues at stake. The issue created by the original choice-of-law agreement is thereby 
eliminated, and the court could refer the parties to arbitration without having to fear for the 
application of its overriding mandatory laws. That is, because the so varied choice-of-law 
agreement – and thus the applicability of the overriding mandatory laws in question – is 
binding on the arbitral tribunal in the future arbitration. The effectiveness of the forum’s 
fundamental policies and market regulations is then no longer at stake. 
 
2. Objections and consequences 
One objection against this contractual solution could be that a unilateral undertaking cannot 
cause the variation of the original agreement. This objection could arise if the party who 
initiated the court proceedings still continues to resist arbitration. However, at this stage, an 
expression of consent to the variation by that party resisting arbitration is irrelevant: its 
consent can be presumed, since the non-application of the forum’s overriding mandatory 
rules is its only legitimate reason for resisting the arbitration agreement. Accordingly, the 
resisting party would be stopped from rejecting the undertaking given by the party moving to 
stay the court proceedings. Moreover, inverse concerns that the latter party had given the 
undertaking under duress because of the court’s threat to ignore the arbitration agreement 
would also miss the point. It would ignore the fundamental nature of both overriding 
mandatory laws and party autonomy: the foreign party was never free to contract out of the 
application of the overriding mandatory laws in the first place. The undertaking given is 
nothing but the reconciliation of the parties’ autonomy with the legal framework in which 
that autonomy is exercised. The undertaking is no different from, for example, a behavioural 
undertaking given by a merged entity in order to obtain clearance of the merger from the 
competition authority. Finally, a theoretical objection that the application of lois 
d’application immediate, which – by definition – define their own scope application 
themselves, cannot be dependent on the parties’ intention would also be of no concern. The 
parties do nothing more than acknowledge, and undertake to respect, the (in any case 
overriding mandatory) scope of application of those rules upon which they had previously 
cast doubt by their original choice of law. From that perspective, their agreement merely 
serves the purpose of avoiding the legal sanction (non-enforceability of the arbitration 
agreement) that the court would have to impose in case they insisted on their original choice. 
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Once the court has referred the parties to arbitration on this basis, the so obtained 
variation of the choice-of-law agreement is then binding on the most party-autonomy-minded 
arbitrators. The arbitral tribunal is no longer torn by the dilemma between loyalty to the 
parties and regulatory threat. The object of the variation agreement is technically a dépeçage: 
as much as the originally chosen law remains generally the lex contractus, the parties accept 
its derogation by the overriding mandatory laws of the affected market (only) insofar that the 
scope of the latter claims mandatory application as lex specialis. This then defines the arbitral 
tribunal’s mandate to decide the dispute without risking later incompatibilities with the public 
policy of the affected market. 
 
When seen in the context of the ‘public law’ requirement of necessity, courts are 
arguably obliged to request such a clarification on the law to be applied by the arbitral 
tribunal when confronted with arbitration agreements whose enforcement could lead to the 
violation of certain fundamental policies of the forum. So long as a defendant is willing to 
give an undertaking that ensures the applicability of the forum’s overriding mandatory 
provisions, a categorical refusal to enforce the arbitration agreement would constitute an 
excessive, because unnecessary, interference by the State with the parties’ party autonomy – 
at least in its procedural dimension. This solution therefore catalyses the synthesis of the 
antithetical relationship between party autonomy and overriding mandatory provisions 
allowing both for the efficiency of the former and the effectiveness of the latter: the 
defendant has to sacrifice the right to plead the exclusive application of the law originally 
chosen for the sake of keeping the arbitration agreement alive, whereas the claimant can 
invoke the protection of the overriding mandatory laws, yet only by accepting arbitral 
jurisdiction. 
VI. Conclusion 
Overriding mandatory laws, at least those of and in the EU, are not any kind of ghost 
haunting the efficiency of international arbitration. When framed and applied correctly, they 
are, indeed, the lois de police that enforce a minimum of respect for national and EU public 
policies. As much as they may appear as antithetical to international arbitration, it is their 
public law nature that allows drawing a synthesis between the interests at stake: ‘private’ and 
‘public’ legal certainty. 
 
It is worth noting that the Scherk rhetoric of legal certainty in international trade 
requiring the enforcement of jurisdictional and choice-of-law agreements cuts both ways.
114
 
Leaving all public interest issues to the ex post control at the stages of enforcement would 
indeed enhance the ‘orderliness and predictability’ in international contracts. However, it 
would be at the expense of the ‘orderliness and predictability’ that the legislature intended to 
guarantee to market participants, contractual stipulations notwithstanding, by defining a 
stable basis of their operations in an overriding mandatory rule of law.
115
 Put differently, 
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enforcing arbitration and choice-of-law agreements in order not to ‘imperil businessmen’s 
willingness to enter into international commercial agreements’116 could result in ignoring that 
the design of the EU overriding mandatory laws is precisely to ensure the establishment and 
good functioning of the Internal Market – and thereby also foreign businessmen’s 
opportunity to access, and benefit from, the level playing field of the so regulated markets.
117
  
 
The problem then boils down to the question of why ‘private’ legal certainty should be 
given primacy over ‘public’ legal certainty. This becomes more tangible when considering 
the reproach that animates the criticism of the European court decisions, notably that they 
would approve a breach of good faith of one of the parties.
118
 The fallacy is the following: 
statuta institutionalia do not, and cannot, care about the individual arrangements but only 
about ensuring the functioning of the market through their rule over the multitude of 
individual contracts they regulate.
119
 That is precisely the reason why they constitute 
overriding mandatory laws. This becomes even more palpable when considering Article 
101(2) TFEU, the archetype overriding mandatory rule of EU law: any agreements prohibited 
by EU competition law, because distorting the level playing field of the Internal Market, 
‘shall be automatically void’. There is simply no good faith to start with – and thus no 
legitimate expectations – when parties enter into such agreements that undermine competition 
on the Internal Market. Smart use of party autonomy cannot possibly change that outcome.  
 
Counsel drafting international agreements need to do their homework. In virtually all 
cases discussed here, starting with Ingmar, there is nothing indicating an intent to evade EU 
laws. It seems that counsel for the North American companies have simply ignored the 
problem of overriding mandatory laws in other jurisdictions and (understandably) wanted 
uniformity in their contracts with agents or distributors around the globe – rather than being 
lucid about, and accepting, the different regulation of the foreign markets on which they wish 
to operate. Here, as well, the rhetoric of the US Supreme Court cuts both ways, if flipped 
around. The parties that simplistically insist on compliance with the jurisdictional and choice-
of-law clauses have to accept that: 
 
We cannot have trade and commerce in world markets and international waters 
exclusively on our [preferred] terms, governed by our [preferred] laws, and resolved 
in our [preferred] courts.
120
 
 
The heart of the problem is one of perspective. Arbitration practitioners are rightly 
worried about abusive invocation of some public interest reflected in overriding mandatory 
laws outside the chosen lex contractus
121
 – after all, it is arbitration practitioners who raise 
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such issues if that is in the interest of their clients. From this (private law) perspective of 
pacta sunt servanda, the understandable preference is for letting the arbitration move forward 
and limiting control to ex post review by courts at the challenge or enforcement stage, to 
dissuade obstructive practices. The focus is thus: what if there is nothing to the party’s 
argument of public interests?  
 
From a (public law) perspective of economic regulation, however, the focus is from the 
other side: what if there is? Because if there is, regulatory efficiency may well be 
compromised by the private transaction, which then calls for privileging, in case of (justified) 
doubt, the public interest of the affected market. The public law perspective is compelling for 
courts – and ultimately unproblematic for arbitration if properly tempered by the limitations 
that public law itself provides for the protection of private interests, notably proportionality. 
Arbitration is unhindered so long as the application of overriding mandatory laws is ensured. 
What potentially remains is the unease with trusting national courts to address and dispose of 
these issues properly. However, the trust in the courts’ capacity may just be the price to be 
paid for gaining their trust in the arbitrators’ capacity to uphold public interests in 
international arbitration. 
